• USDT attracted Property Rights: The High Court confirmed that stablecoins can constitute a distinct form of property under English law, satisfying the Ainsworth criteria.
• Constructive Trusts Apply: The court accepted that a constructive trust potentially arises over crypto assets obtained by fraud.
• Opaque Evidence Can Be Fatal: The claim failed because the cryptocurrency expert’s methodology could not be verified or explained step-by-step.
• Transparency is Crucial: This judgment suggests that courts will rigorously scrutinise forensic reports to ensure they allow for a “mathematical audit” of the flow of funds, particularl;y where commingled funds exist.

Case Citation & Jurisdiction

• Case Name: Fabrizio D’Aloia v Persons Unknown Category A and Others
• Neutral Citation: [2024] EWHC 2342 (Ch)
• Jurisdiction: High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Business List (Chancery Division)
• Date of Judgment: 12 September 2024

Factual Background

The Claimant, Mr D’Aloia, was the victim of a sophisticated cryptocurrency investment scam involving a platform known as “td-finan”. He was duped into believing he was investing through a legitimate cryptocurrency exchange, leading to the theft of approximately 2.1 million USDT.

The legal action against the Sixth Defendant, Bitkub, focused on one specific tranche of 400,000 USDT. The Claimant asserted that these funds were traced through the blockchain to a wallet hosted by the Thai-based exchange.

Bitkub defended the claim on the basis that they never received the Claimant’s specific crypto assets. Consequently, the case turned on the reliability of the tracing evidence used to link the theft to the exchange. [J. 1-2]

Can Legal Liability Exist Without Transparent Tracing Evidence?

The central challenge in D’Aloia was whether established legal principles could succeed when the underlying forensic evidence was opaque. The Claimant successfully argued the theoretical points regarding property and trusts. However, the claim failed because the expert’s methodology could not be verified to prove the USDT in question reached the defendant.

The High Court’s Findings

Issue 1: Is USDT Property under English Law?

The court addressed the foundational question of whether stablecoins attract property rights [J.106]. It ruled that USDT is a distinct form of property under English law, satisfying the classic Ainsworth criteria. This finding rejected the argument that crypto-assets are merely information incapable of being owned.

We examine the full implications of this property ruling in our detailed breakdown: Is USDT Property Under English Law?

Issue 2: Constructive Trusts and VASPs

The judgment confirmed that a constructive trust may arise over assets obtained by fraud [J. 19-21]. However, the claim against the exchange failed on the facts because the VASP was not found to be shown to hold any trust funds. Without proven receipt, the exchange could not be liable as a constructive trustee.

We analyse the court’s refusal to impose a trust on the exchange in our focused article: Constructive Trust Claims Against Cryptocurrency Exchanges.

Issue 3: The Flaw in Tracing Methodology

The dismissal of the claim hinged on the rejection of the claimant’s expert evidence. The court found the expert’s methodology to be “chaotic” and contradictory, lacking a transparent, replicable method [J. 58]. This failure to verify the flow of funds meant the necessary legal link to the defendant was missing.

We detail the specific methodological errors that proved fatal to the claim in our expert review: Cryptocurrency Tracing Methodology Scrutinised.

Analysis & Strategic Implications: A Forensic Case Study

While D’Aloia is a UK High Court decision and not binding in other jurisdictions, it illuminates a challenge relevant to litigators globally. The judgment offers an insight to how courts may approach the gap between legal theory and forensic evidence. It highlights that establishing property rights is effective only if the underlying tracing data is accepted by the court.

Litigators may find the court’s focus on the “verifiable audit trail” of the tracing report particularly noteworthy. The case illustrates that defendants can successfully challenge claims by scrutinising the expert’s ability to explain their methodology. This suggests that defensibility often hinges on a clear, replicable explanation of fund movements.

Ultimately, while specific to English law, the ruling typifies a broader tension between automated tools and forensic rigour. An expert witness was required to articulate their logic clearly, rather than relying solely on software outputs. This focus on transparency provides a useful reference point for future cross-jurisdictional disputes.

The post D’Aloia v Persons Unknown Judgment Analysis: Implications for Tracing and VASP Liability appeared first on Captura Cyber.

This judgment provides three clear implications regarding the admissibility of expert evidence in crypto-asset related matters.

• Transparency is Mandatory: Courts will reject expert evidence if the cryptocurrency tracing methodology cannot be clearly explained or verified by the opposing party [J.55].
• “Black Box” Evidence is Fatal: An expert cannot rely on proprietary software or “investigative experience” as a substitute for a principled, reproducible method [J.60].
• Mathematical Rigour is Required: If the numbers do not add up during a judicial “mathematical audit,” the evidence will be dismissed as unreliable [J.67].

Case Citation & Jurisdiction

• Case Name: Fabrizio D’Aloia v Persons Unknown Category A and Others
• Neutral Citation: [2024] EWHC 2342 (Ch)
• Jurisdiction: High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Business List (Chancery Division)
• Date of Judgment: 12 September 2024

Factual Background: D’Aloia vs. Persons Unknown

The Claimant, Mr D’Aloia, was the victim of a sophisticated cryptocurrency investment scam that began in July 2021. He was duped into believing he was investing through a legitimate cryptocurrency exchange. This conviction led to the transfer of a substantial quantity of digital assets.

In total, approximately 2.1 million USDT, a stablecoin, was stolen across multiple transactions. The core of the legal action focused on one specific tranche of 400,000 USDT.

The fraudulent transactions were traced to a specific wallet address controlled by the anonymous fraudsters (Persons Unknown). The central factual issue was the subsequent movement of those specific funds.

The Claimant asserted that the 400,000 USDT were moved through the blockchain and ultimately reached an account held at the Sixth Defendant, Bitkub. Bitkub is a registered VASP (Virtual Asset Service Provider) based in Thailand. The entire case against Bitkub hinged on establishing this final link via cryptocurrency tracing evidence.

Can a “Black Box” Tracing Methodology Support a Claim?

The central evidentiary challenge was whether an expert’s tracing methodology could be relied upon when it lacked transparency and consistency.

The Claimant’s expert purportedly applied a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) methodology to trace funds from the point of Loss to Bitkub’s Wallet address. However, he admitted in cross-examination that he had “refined” this approach based on proprietary software training [J.245].

This created a “black box” scenario. The court was asked to trust the expert’s findings without being able to mathematically verify the flow of funds [J.259].

Key Findings

The Rejection of the Expert Evidence

The Court found the expert’s evidence to be “chaotic and, ultimately, contradictory” [J.58]. While the expert claimed to use FIFO, the court found he had applied a subjective methodology that cherry-picked transactions to maximise the Claimant’s recovery [J.262].

Crucially, this methodology ignored the funds of other potential innocent victims. By disregarding pre-existing balances and intermediate incoming funds, the expert violated the principle of treating innocent contributors equally [J.262].

The Necessity of a Transparent Methodology

The court emphasised that while English law permits tracing methods beyond strict FIFO (such as pari passu or rolling charge), any alternative must be “methodologically sound and properly evidenced” [J.7iii].

In this instance, the lack of a coherent, explainable method meant the court could not perform a mathematical audit of the flow of funds [J.67].

Consequently, the court held that the Claimant had failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that any of his funds reached the Defendant’s wallet [J.264].

Analysis & Implications

Litigators cannot rely on an expert’s credentials or the reputation of their proprietary software alone. Defensibility requires transparency. Experts must be able to open the “black box” and explain, step-by-step, how the software reached its conclusion.

If the methodology cannot be replicated or mathematically audited by the court, the evidence risks being ruled inadmissible. When instructing a blockchain expert, insistence on a defensible methodology is critical, rather than accepting a simple software printout.

Experts must be capable of explaining their logic to a layperson, and their chosen method of accounting for sommingled cryptocurrencies (whether FIFO, pari passu or otherwise) should be applied consistently, rather than conveniently.

The post Cryptocurrency Tracing Methodology Scrutinised: D’Aloia v Persons Unknown appeared first on Captura Cyber.

• This ruling provided a clear Canadian precedent for how crypto exchanges discharge duty of care through active, documented warnings.
• The court placed significant evidentiary weight on compliance actions beyond the standard User Agreement, including recorded phone calls and staff warnings.
• An exchange was not required to refuse a transaction, even if a scam was suspected, provided it had clearly and repeatedly warned the customer of the risks.
• The court’s acceptance of the exchange’s internal risk assessment (BitRank analysis) as evidence highlighted the value of maintaining auditable compliance procedures.
• The decision to award costs against the plaintiff reinforced the strength of a defence built on proactive, documented, and unheeded customer warnings.

Case Citation & Jurisdiction

Xu v. NDAX Canada, 2025 BCSC 2048 (British Columbia Supreme Court)

Factual Background

The plaintiff, Ms. Xu, was the victim of a sophisticated cryptocurrency scam. She was convinced by an unnamed person to invest in a fraudulent scheme that promised returns of 1% per day. After the scammer built trust by returning initial small investments, Ms. Xu was persuaded to invest a much larger sum [J.3].

To acquire the necessary funds, Ms. Xu remortgaged her house and borrowed from a friend. Between April 11 and May 17, 2023, she opened an account with the defendant, NDAX Canada, and deposited $671,000, which she used to purchase Ethereum [J.4-7].

On April 18, 2023, Ms. Xu initiated a withdrawal of Ethereum to an external wallet address provided by the scammer. This action triggered a multi-stage warning protocol from NDAX.

First, the platform presented Ms. Xu with a “Crypto Risk Disclosure,” explicitly warning that sending funds to an untrusted wallet could result in permanent loss and to be wary of high-return investment opportunities. She was also presented with a “Second Warning” confirming the irreversibility of crypto-asset withdrawals . Ms. Xu clicked “accept” on both [J.10 – 12].

Second, an NDAX employee contacted Ms. Xu by phone for the “Third Warning.” During this call, the employee explicitly told Ms. Xu that she was “likely ‘being scammed'” and advised her not to proceed with the transaction. Ms. Xu ignored this warning, insisted on proceeding, and threatened legal action if NDAX did not comply [J.13 – 14].

Third, due to the identified risk, the call was escalated to a compliance officer for a “Fourth Warning”. During this call, Ms. Xu falsely informed the officer that she was an accountant, had been trading stocks for 20 years, and that the recipient wallet was her own . She reaffirmed her understanding of the risks and confirmed her instructions to process the transfer [J.15].

The court noted that prior to the transfer, NDAX conducted a “BitRank analysis” on the recipient wallet, which returned an acceptable score, indicating it was not, at that time, flagged for fraudulent activity [J.18].

Following Ms. Xu’s explicit final confirmation, NDAX processed the first transaction. Ms. Xu then proceeded with two subsequent transfers to the same scammer’s wallet, resulting in the total loss of her $671,000 [J.16, J.17].

When is a Crypto Exchange Liable for a Customer’s Scam Losses?

This case provided a direct answer to this question. The plaintiff argued that the defendant, NDAX, breached a duty of care owed to her by failing to advise her that the recipient wallet was controlled by a “scammer” [J.22].

The court had to determine what actions were required for an exchange to satisfy its standard of care when faced with suspicious circumstances and a client actively ignoring risks.

The case tested how crypto exchanges discharge duty of care when a customer, under the influence of a scammer, insists on proceeding with a high-risk, irreversible transaction. The ruling hinged on whether NDAX’s multi-layered warnings were sufficient, or if they were required to take the further step of refusing the transaction entirely.

The BC Supreme Court’s Findings

The court’s findings focused on the specific, documented actions the exchange took after identifying the transaction’s risk.

The Four Warnings: The Multi-Layered Intervention

The court analysed the four-stage warning process NDAX deployed. It noted that the first two warnings (the “Crypto Risk Disclosure” and the “Second Warning”) were part of the defendant’s standard, routine system [J.35].

The court placed significant weight on the direct, human interventions. It highlighted the “Third Warning,” a recorded phone call where an employee explicitly advised the plaintiff she was “likely ‘being scammed'”. The court found this warning “could not have been clearer” [J.13].

It also noted the “Fourth Warning,” an escalation to a compliance officer. This final attempt to warn the plaintiff was met with an insistent demand to proceed, including threats of legal action [J.38].

The Finding on the Standard of Care

The plaintiff’s claim that NDAX should have identified the specific recipient wallet as a “scammer” was rejected. The court found this was information the defendant did not have; in fact, its internal BitRank analysis of the wallet returned an acceptable (non-fraudulent) score at the time [J.18, J.37].

The court concluded that NDAX had warned of the potential for a scam, which was the key risk. It stated there was “no evidence or basis to conclude that further warnings… would have convinced the plaintiff” [J.37].

Importantly, the court found that NDAX was not entitled to simply refuse the transaction against the plaintiff’s clear instructions [J.39]. The court’s core finding was unambiguous: “…I am able to conclude that the defendant satisfied any standard of care that would have been applicable” [J.34].

The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed, and costs awarded [J.43].

Analysis & Implications

For litigators analysing how crypto exchanges discharge duty of care, this case is an important precedent. The court’s decision was based on the evidentiary power of proactive compliance records, moving the defensibility argument far beyond the standard User Agreement.

Our Analysis: Beyond the User Agreement

While the plaintiff had accepted a User Agreement and Risk Statement, the court’s analysis went significantly deeper. The strength of the defence rested on the specific, auditable compliance actions NDAX took after identifying the suspicious transaction.

The court scrutinised the recorded phone calls, the “Third Warning,” and the compliance officer’s “Fourth Warning” [J.13, J.15]. This evidence demonstrated, in a way a click-wrap agreement cannot, that the exchange made a clear and explicit effort to warn the plaintiff of the specific risk she faced. The warnings were not generic; they were direct, human, and recorded.

The court’s acceptance of the internal “BitRank analysis” as evidence is a key data point [J.18]. It showed the exchange had an internal risk assessment process and followed it. Even though the wallet was not yet flagged, the analysis itself was part of the “reasonable” standard of care the court found NDAX had satisfied [J.34].

For Litigators: Why Documented Warnings are a Core Defensibility Asset

For litigators, this ruling highlights that the core of a successful defensibility argument lies in evidence beyond the Terms & Conditions. The court’s focus on the record of these warnings—the call logs, the compliance officer’s testimony, and the internal risk report—is the central lesson.

This case demonstrates that a court will give significant weight to documented, proactive interventions. When defending an exchange or VASP, counsel should immediately seek this evidence. Call recordings, email chains with compliance staff, and internal risk reports (like the BitRank analysis) are admissible, court-tested assets for building a robust defence.

The court’s decision to award costs against the plaintiff  [J.43] signals that when an exchange can provide a clear, documented record of having warned a customer who then proceeds to ignore those warnings, the judiciary is prepared to fully endorse the sufficiency of the exchange’s actions.

The post How Crypto Exchanges Discharge Duty of Care: Xu v. NDAX Canada appeared first on Captura Cyber.

• USDT is Property: The UK High Court ruled that the stablecoin USDT is subject to property rights under the law of England and Wales.
• A Distinct Form of Property: The court found that USDT is neither a ‘chose in action’ nor a ‘chose in possession’ but is instead a distinct, third category of property.
• Satisfies the Ainsworth Criteria: USDT was found to meet the classic four-point legal test for property, as it is definable, identifiable, capable of assumption by third parties, and possesses some degree of permanence.
• Enables Proprietary Claims: This ruling confirms that USDT is capable of being the subject of tracing and can constitute trust property, reinforcing the availability of equitable remedies for recovery.
• Technology Merits Considered: The judgment indicated that while all cryptocurrencies are not the same, the court will analyse the specific technology and its function to determine its legal status.

Case Citation & Jurisdiction

• Case Name: Fabrizio D’Aloia v Persons Unknown Category A and Others
• Neutral Citation: [2024] EWHC 2342 (Ch)
• Jurisdiction: High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Business List (Chancery Division)
• Date of Judgment: 12 September 2024

Factual Background

The Claimant, Mr D’Aloia, was the victim of a sophisticated cryptocurrency investment scam that began in July 2021. He was duped into believing he was investing through a legitimate cryptocurrency exchange. This conviction led to the transfer of a substantial quantity of digital assets.

In total, approximately 2.1 million USDT was stolen across multiple transactions. The fraudulent transactions were traced to a specific wallet address controlled by the anonymous fraudsters (Persons Unknown). [J. 2]

The case against the anonymous fraudsters and the Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) that subsequently received the assets hinged on several complex legal and technical questions. To pursue proprietary remedies, such as a constructive trust—which relies on the process of tracing—a foundational question had to be answered: Were the stolen assets legally considered “property” at all? [J. 5]

Are Stablecoins Legally Recognised as Property?

For the Claimant to pursue any proprietary claim, the court first had to determine if the stolen assets—USDT—could be legally defined as property under English law. 

While both the Claimant and Bitkub (the Defendant) accepted that USDT is something to which property rights can attach [J. 105], the court still conducted a detailed analysis. Bitkub’s own business model as an exchange is premised on such assets having legal recognition. [J. 5]

The court’s detailed analysis was necessary to address strong, opposing arguments from academic commentary—namely, that crypto-assets are “mere information” and that property must be tied to legally recognised rights.

To provide a solid basis for its finding, the court had to counter this “information argument”. It did so by defining the asset not as mere data, but as a “composite thing” combining data with “transactional functionalities”. This combination, the court found, is sufficient to attract property rights. [J. 156 – 166]

The High Court’s Findings: Applying the Ainsworth Criteria to USDT

The High Court’s final determination was that USD Tether (USDT) unequivocally attracts property rights under English law.

The court’s analysis was methodical. It drew heavily on the principles applied to Bitcoin in AA v Persons Unknown, which utilised the four classic criteria for property set out in National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth.

The High Court found that USDT satisfies all four Ainsworth criteria:

• It is definable: USDT can be clearly defined by reference to its data structure, the public ledger, and its cryptographic security.
• It is identifiable by third parties: The existence of a specific USDT token is verifiable by third parties through the public blockchain.
• It is capable of assumption by third parties: The nature of the blockchain system is that third parties can assume the power to control and transfer the asset.
• It has some degree of permanence or stability: The asset’s persistence is secured by the distributed ledger.

The court concluded that USDT is a distinct form of property, separate from a ‘chose in action’ or ‘chose in possession’. [J. 108 – 134]

Rejecting the “Mere Information” Argument

A significant hurdle addressed by the court was the academic argument that crypto-assets are “simply information” and that English law generally does not recognise property rights in mere information.

The court countered this by defining the property as a “composite thing”. It found that the asset is not just the data (the public and private keys) but a combination of that data and its “transactional functionalities”. This combination gives the asset a form and expectation of performance sufficient to attract property rights. [J. 156]

The “Extinction/Creation Argument” vs. The “Persistent Thing”

The court also analysed the “extinction/creation argument”—a technical position that upon transfer, the existing USDT token is “destroyed” and a new one is “created”.

This technical distinction is legally critical. If an asset is “destroyed” on transfer, it becomes impossible to “follow” it to a new owner; one could only “trace” its value.

The court rejected this analysis, characterising USDT as a “persistent thing”. It was found that the core property—the combination of data and transactional functionalities—remains unchanged upon transfer. This persistent identity makes it more like a chose in possession, and the court accepted that, in principle, “following” the asset should be an option. [J. 204]

Analysis & Implications

This judgement is a clear signal that the High Court focused on the function of a crypto-asset, not just its underlying technology. The court acknowledged the technical differences between assets but ultimately regarded their function as similar enough to be treated the same for the purposes of the law.

For litigators, this judgment provides a solid, trial-level precedent based in the UK that stablecoins like USDT are property. This finding strengthens the foundation for proprietary remedies.

However, the ruling also serves as a warning. While the court found in favour of this asset, its willingness to dissect technical arguments (like “extinction/creation”) shows that the specific merits of an asset’s technology are now firmly in play.

Litigators should be aware that all crypto-assets are not the same. This precedent may not apply uniformly to a different token with a different technical architecture. The defensibility of a future claim may hinge on an expert’s ability to explain why a specific asset meets the Ainsworth criteria, just as was done in D’Aloia.

The post Is USDT Property Under English Law? D’Aloia v Persons Unknown appeared first on Captura Cyber.

This judgment provides four clear implications for litigators seeking to impose a Constructive Trust over stolen crypto assets.

• Constructive Trust Legal Mechanism Available: The court accepted that a constructive trust will arise automatically over property obtained by fraud against the fraudulent recipient (Persons Unknown) [J.341]. This applies to crypto assets with the same force as it does to traditional assets.
• Burden of Proof on the Claimant: The claim ultimately failed because the Claimant could not prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the stolen assets ever reached the defendant VASP[J.383]. The essential legal link was technically missing.
• VASP Not Liable on the Facts: The court accepted the legal availability of a constructive trust, but the VASP was not found to hold any trust funds and could not be considered a constructive trustee in this instance [J.383].
• Evidence of Cryptocurrency Tracing was the Failure Point: Establishing a constructive trust was primarily a question of successful, admissible, and forensically sound cryptocurrency tracing [J.6-7]. Flawed cryptocurrency tracing evidence meant the legal link was absent.

Case Citation & Jurisdiction

• Case Name: Fabrizio D’Aloiaa v Persons Unknown Category A and Others
• Neutral Citation: [2024] EWHC 2342 (Ch)
• Jurisdiction: High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Business List (Chancery Division)
• Date of Judgment: 12 September 2024

Factual Background: D’Aloia vs. Persons Unknown

The Claimant, Mr D’Aloiaa, was the victim of a sophisticated cryptocurrency investment scam that began in July 2021. He was duped into believing he was investing through a legitimate cryptocurrency exchange. This conviction led to the transfer of a substantial quantity of digital assets.

In total, approximately 2.1 million USDT, a stablecoin, was stolen across multiple transactions. The core of the legal action focused on one specific tranche of 400,000 USDT.

The fraudulent transactions were traced to a specific wallet address controlled by the anonymous fraudsters (Persons Unknown). This Constructive Trust was accepted as arising over those funds at that point. The central factual issue was the subsequent movement of those specific funds. 

The Claimant asserted that the 400,000 USDT were moved through the blockchain and ultimately reached an account held at the Sixth Defendant, Bitkub. Bitkub is a registered VASP (Virtual Asset Service Provider) based in Thailand. The entire case against Bitkub hinged on establishing this final link via cryptocurrency tracing evidence. [J.1-3]

Imposing a Constructive Trust on a VASP

This case required the court to navigate established equitable principles and technical blockchain evidence. The High Court accepted the principle of a constructive trust in cryptocurrency: property obtained by fraud creates an automatic trust in favour of the original owner [J.343]. This framework applies to digital assets with the same force as it does to traditional assets.

The core legal question was whether the Constructive Trust should be extended from the fraudster to the VASP (Bitkub). To succeed, the Claimant had to technically prove that his specific, stolen crypto assets were still identifiable within the Bitkub ecosystem. The claim against Bitkub relied entirely on the assertion that the funds had been deposited into a specific Bitkub wallet address. Bitkub’s defence was purely factual, arguing that it was an innocent third-party intermediary that never received the Claimant’s crypto assets. Therefore, there could be no constructive trust and VASP liability, as Bitkub was not holding any trust property [J.4ii]. The success of the Constructive Trust claim rested entirely on the technical accuracy, admissibility, and forensic soundness of the underlying cryptocurrency tracing report.

The Court’s Findings

The Court ruled in favour of the Sixth Defendant, Bitkub. The Claimant failed to satisfy the court, on the balance of probabilities, that any of his stolen USDT ever arrived at the designated Bitkub wallet address [J.383]. The tracing evidence presented was deemed unreliable and failed to establish a critical factual link between the Claimant’s loss and Bitkub’s receipt.

The judgment confirmed the legal availability of the Constructive Trust mechanism in a cryptocurrency context. The court accepted that a Constructive Trust had automatically arisen over the funds in the hands of the fraudsters (Persons Unknown). However, the absence of a proven receipt by the VASP meant the legal link connecting the Claimant to Bitkub was missing from the claim [J.383].

Since Bitkub was found never to have received the trust property, the claim for Constructive Trust, VASP liability, and breach of trust could not succeed. The court noted that no claim for “knowing receipt” had been asserted, preventing the Claimant from pursuing an alternative path for remedy [J.20]. The outcome thus turned entirely on the failure to establish the factual chain of ownership, not on a fundamental flaw in the equitable principle.

Analysis and Implications

The D’Aloia Judgment found that the equitable remedy of Constructive Trust was fully available for crypto asset recovery. It signalled that UK courts will apply well-established equitable principles to digital assets. The objective of establishing a Constructive Trust in cryptocurrency is sound, provided the technical burden is met.

This case is a reminder that legal principles are not precise. The failure to prove that the stolen funds reached the VASP was the single, fatal flaw of the claim [J.382]. Therefore, the Constructive Trust and VASP relationship requires a chain of evidence that is admissible and forensically defensible under cross-examination.

For any action seeking a Constructive Trust over funds held by an exchange, parties must consider the quality of the cryptocurrency-tracing evidence to prove the factual link to the VASP.

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